The Interaction subdomain is based on the idea that more governmental interaction means more occasions for a government official to solicit a bribe. It measures the frequency and depth of business interactions with government, including variables such as how many visits with tax officials are typically required, and how many procedures it takes to start a business.

Would a government official be surprised if you offered a bribe…or would they be surprised if you didn’t? The Expectation subdomain captures the degree to which bribery is considered normal and expected, relying on variables that measure the frequency of bribery demands and whether public officials and private firms generally act ethically.

Inefficient bureaucracies provide civil servants with greater leverage to extract bribes. The greater the regulatory burden, the more prolonged the interaction and the more opportunity for leverage. This subdomain measures opportunities government officials have to apply their leverage if a bribe is not paid, including variables that measure the amount of government regulation, the time required to comply with them, and whether they are fairly applied and enforced.

This subdomain represents a variety of social attitudes and behaviors that may collectively affect the frequency of bribe demands. It includes factors such as whether citizens view receiving a bribe as acceptable, the rapidity with which social norms are passed on to new arrivals, and the extent to which people are driven primarily by material need.

The Enforcement subdomain contains variables that measure the more formal aspects of bribery deterrence, such as the effectiveness of the country’s anti-corruption policy, whether government officials are held accountable for misdeeds, and the independence and ability of the judicial branch to enforce the law.

Greater governmental transparency makes it easier to hold officials accountable. This subdomain measures how transparent the government is as it performs its normal regulatory functions. The more transparent the government is in procurement, nationalized natural resource extraction, and policymaking, the less room there is for bribery and the greater the ability of the press and citizenry to expose corruption.

This subdomain concerns the difficulty there may be in tracking public funds, based on variables including the openness and reliability of information on firms and the degree to which the government is subject to outside audit.

A free press makes it more difficult for officials to act corruptly with impunity and can also drive public attitudes about corruption. We measure how free and powerful the press is by reference to surveys from Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders, as well as more general variables concerning freedom of expression.

Strong civic institutions can act as a counterbalance to government power and a bulwark against corruption. We measure the strength of such institutions through proxies like the Human Development Index, and more directly through variables from the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the World Justice Project assessing the degree of civil society participation.